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TAX-EXEMPT PUBLIC
CHARITIES:
INCREASING
ACCOUNTABILITY AND
COMPLIANCE
ROBERT C. DEGAUDENZI*
INTRODUCTION
The federal government has long embraced the view that charitable
and other public service organizations should be exempt from federal in-
come tax.' This policy is codified by section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Rev-
enue Code (the "Code"), 2 which generally permits an exemption for so-
called "public charities."3 The term public charities, a misnomer per-
haps, includes not only churches and other traditionally charitable orga-
nizations,4 but also universities, hospitals, research institutions and
* LL.M. Candidate, New York University (taxation); J.D. 1994, St. John's University; B.S.
1989, New York University; C.P.A., State of Maryland.
I See BRUCE R. HOPiINs, THE LAW OF TAx-ExEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 1.2 (5th ed. 1987 &
Supp. 1988-1991) (analyzing traditional public policy rationale of federal tax exemption);
Boris I. Bittker & George K Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Fed-
eral Income Tax, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 301-05 (1976) (discussing origin and early legislative
efforts relating to federal tax exemption).
2 I.R.C. § 501(cX3) (1988); see infra notes 37-76 and accompanying text (discussing re-
quirements of section 501(cX3)). All section references are with respect to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
3 See PAUL E. TREUSCH, TAx-ExmvT CHARrrABLE ORGANIZATIONS 577 (3d ed. 1988) (noting
that term "public charities" is not found in Internal Revenue Code, but refers to organiza-
tions exempt under section 501(cX3) not constituting private foundations); infra notes 84-
86 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between public charities and private
foundations).
4 See HopINs, supra note 1, §§ 6.1-.2 (describing historically "charitable" activities).
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similar organizations.' In recent years, despite their seemingly laudable
objectives, tax-exempt public charities have become the focus of critical
commentary and increased scrutiny by the federal government, 6 the
legal community7 and the public.8
Although no single event can be credited for generating such fervent
interest in the tax-exempt sector, numerous media accounts detailing
questionable and, at times, abusive dealings by owners and officers of
well-known tax-exempt entities were certainly major factors.9 One of
5 See Unofficial Transcript of Oversight Committee Hearing on Nonprofit Abuses, TAX
NOTES TODAY, June 21, 1993, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Libary, TNT File [hereinafter
Hearings 11; I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988).
6 See infra notes 21-36 and accompanying text (discussing recent abuses in tax-exempt
field and need for legislative changes). The Internal Revenue Service (the "I.R.S.") has
taken steps to curb abuses by tax-exempt organizations by imposing increased disclosure
requirements on such organizations. See Marlis L. Carson, New Form 990 Contains Re-
vised Revenue Reporting Requirements, TAx NOTES TODAY, Mar. 7, 1994, available in
LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File. In addition, the I.R.S. is stepping up its audit examina-
tion procedures of various types of tax-exempt organizations. See, e.g., Marlis L. Carson &
Barbara Kirchheimer, Tax Forum Covers Wide Range of EO Issues, 60 TAX NOTES 1545,
1545 (1994) (reporting that "examinations of 501(c)(3) health care organizations will be the
Services 'number one' focus in... 1994"); Paul Streckfus, IRS Continues to Turn Up the
Heat on Colleges and Universities, 62 TAX NOTES 1651, 1652 (1994) (noting that I.R.S. has
'new aggressiveness" in audits of colleges and universities).
7 See, e.g., Bonnie Brier, Compensation: How To Attract Good People Without Losing Tax
Exemption, in TAX-ExEuvr CHARIrAaLE ORGANIZATIONS 1993, at 163, 165-68 (ABA-PLI
Course of Study Materials No. C875, 1993) (discussing current events prompting increased
scrutiny of tax-exempt organizations); Michael W. Peregrine & Bernadette M. Broccolo,
Stark Proposals Sends Message: Intermediate Sanctions are Coming, 9 EXEMPT ORGANIZA-
TION TAX REV. 131, 133-36 (1994) (analyzing legislative proposal aimed at reducing abuses
by exempt organizations).
Traditionally, legal scholars rarely questioned the fundamental validity of tax-exempt
organizations. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 1, at 299. Over the past 15 years, how-
ever, there has been a deluge of scholarly writing espousing new, and criticizing other,
theories and doctrines regarding tax-exempt organizations. See, e.g., Robert Atkinson, Al-
truism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REv. 501 (1990); Mark A. Hall & John D.
Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379
(1991); Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980); cf
Deborah A. DeMott, Self-Dealing Transactions in Nonprofit Corporations, 59 BROOK L.
REv. 131 (1993) (criticizing existing legal doctrines and theories in nonprofit corporate law).
8 See infra notes 9-16 and accompanying text (discussing news accounts regarding tax-
exempt organizations).
9 See 139 CONG. REC. H10986 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1993) (statement of Representative Fort-
ney Pete Stark introducing H.R. 3697, exempt organization reform legislation). Other fac-
tors that may have contributed to the increased debate over tax-exempt organizations in-
dude the dramatic growth of the tax-exempt sector, see infra note 19, and proposed health
care reform legislation which may result in expanded use of tax-exempt health mainte-
nance organizations ("HMOs"). See Robert A. Boisture, Assessing the Impact of Health Care
Reform on the Formation of Tax-Exempt Health Care Providers and HMOs, 62 TAX NOTES
1181, 1186-88 (1994); Marlis L. Carson, Schultz and Vance Outline Plans for Intermediate
Sanctions, TAx NOTES TODAY, Mar. 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File.
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the first, and perhaps most infamous, examples of such an account in-
volved televangelist Jim Bakker whose extravagant lifestyle-largely fi-
nanced by defrauding members of his PTL ministry-resulted in a fraud
and conspiracy conviction carrying a forty-five year prison sentence. 10
More recently, televangelist Pat Robertson made headlines when he sold
a division of the tax-exempt Christian Broadcasting Network, of which
he is chairman, turning an investment of $183,000 into $90 million. 11
The list of questionable practices is by no means limited to
televangelists. In 1991, the management of Health Net, a California-
based health maintenance organization ("HMO"), attempted a buyout of
the tax-exempt HMO at a price far below its market value.1 2 Although
the deal was ultimately approved by state regulators, management was
first required to make significant financial and operational concessions
including the retention of only a minority interest in the new entity.13
Similarly, in the United Way of America scandal, United Way's executive
director orchestrated the spin-off of several United Way divisions and
placed relatives and friends in charge of the newly-formed entities. 4
Perhaps raising even more eyebrows than these self-dealing transactions
was the executive director's reported annual compensation of
$463,000.15 Finally, it was reported that the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation
plans to transfer some of its key assets, including its mail-order pharma-
ceutical operations, to a for-profit entity that will be headed by the foun-
dation's president.
16
10 See Art Harris, Jim Bakker Gets 45-Year Sentence; Televangelist Fined $500,000; Eligi-
ble for Parole in 10 Years, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1989, at Al; Gary Klott, PTL's Ledgers:
Missing Records and Rising Debt, N.Y. TIMEs, June 6, 1987, at A8; see also Jeanne Pugh,
Fund-Raising Questions Loom over Some TV Evangelists, ST. PETERSBURG TnEs, Apr. 11,
1987, at 2E (discussing financial misdealing of televangelists).
11 See Robertsons Likely to Make Big Profit on Cable Stock, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TmB., Mar.
28, 1992, at D-2; Allan Sloan, A Heavenly Deal; Preacher Parlays Investment of $183,000
into $90 million, NEWSDAY, Apr. 12, 1992, at 76; Benjamin Weiser, An Empire on Exemp-
tions?: Televangelist Pat Robertson Gained Fortune, and Critics, in Sale of His Cable Net-
work, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1994, at H1.
12 See James F. Peltz, Health Net Takeover Bid Latest to Raise Outcry; Health Care: Critics
Say the Proposal Undervalues the Organization and Shortchanges Charity. It's an Argu-
ment That's Been Heard in Previous HMO Conversions, L.A. TIMEs, July 23, 1991, at 9A.
13 See James F. Peltz, Health Net Wins For-Profit Status; Medicine: The State Lets the
Woodland Hills-Based HMO Convert From a Nonprofit Organization After it Agrees to Cede
Majority Ownership to a Foundation, L.A. TIES, Feb. 8, 1992, at 1.
14 See Felicity Barringer, Charity Boards Learn to be Skeptical, N.Y. TmIMs, Apr. 19, 1992,
at A10 [hereinafter Berringer, Charity Boards]; Felicity Barringer, Son of Ex-United Way
Chief Resigns, N.Y. TIMEs, July 15, 1992, at A19.
15 See Barringer, Charity Boards, supra note 14, at A19.
16 See Michelle Singletary, Charity Votes to Shift Operations; Cystic Fibrosis Foundation
Chief to Quit, Manage Independent Co., WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1993, at A17; Liz Spayd,
Cystic Fibrosis Board Debates Restructuring, CHI. SuN-Tums, Oct. 24, 1993, at 38.
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Prompted by such events,' 7 the Oversight Subcommittee of the
House Ways and Means Committee (the "Subcommittee") conducted
hearings in 1993 and 1994 to address the problem of abuses by organiza-
tions exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Code." s The Subcommittee
heard testimony from officials of the Internal Revenue Service (the
"I.R.S."), United States Treasury, state enforcement agencies and sev-
eral private organizations.' 9 Based on the testimony presented, the fol-
lowing issues were of primary concern to hearing participants: self-deal-
ing and executive compensation, public disclosure and the inadequacy of
sanctions for abuses. 20
Under section 501(c)(3), the activities of a public charity must bene-
fit public, rather than private, interests.2 1 Moreover, a public charity's
net earnings may not inure to the benefit of insiders such as officers,
17 See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
In April 1993, the Philadelphia Inquirer ran a series of articles detailing various is-
sues, problems, and abuses in the tax-exempt sector which was based on an 18-month
study of the tax-returns of 6000 exempt organizations. See, e.g., Gilbert M. Gaul & Neill A.
Borowski, America's Growth Industry They're Called Nonprofit Businesses, But That Does
Not Mean They Can't Make Money, PHLA. INQUIRER, Apr, 18, 1993, at Al; Gilbert M. Gaul
& Neill A. Borowski, The IRS, An Enforcer That Can't Keep Up, PHIA. INQUIRER, Apr. 21,
1993, at Al [hereinafter Gaul & Borowski, IRS Can't Keep Up]; Gilbert M. Gaul & Neill A.
Borowski, For Nonprofits Only: A Cheap Pool of Money, PHLA. INQUIRER, Apr. 23, 1993, at
Al [hereinafter Gaul & Borowski, Cheap Money]; Gilbert M. Gaul & Neill A. Borowski, In
High-Level Jobs at Nonprofits, Charity Really Pays, PHaLA. INQUIRER, Apr. 22, 1993, at Al
[hereinafter Gaul & Borowski, Charity Really Pays].
18 See Hearings I, supra note 5; Unofficial Transcript of W&M Oversight Hearing on Activi-
ties of Public Charities, TAx NoTEs TODAY, Aug. 6, 1993, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Li-
brary, TNT File [hereinafter Hearings II]; Samuels' Testimony on Administration Measures
to Improve TEO Compliance at W&M Oversight Hearing, Tx NoTEs TODAY, Mar. 17, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File [hereinafter Hearings 111].
19 See Hearings I, supra note 5; Hearings II, supra note 18; Hearings III, supra note 18.
Initially, it was noted that tax-exempt organizations are the fastest growing sector of the
United States economy, numbering more than 1.2 million with 30,000 new organizations
created annually. See Hearings I, supra note 5. In addition, exempt organizations in the
aggregate account for approximately $1 trillion in assets and have annual revenues of $500
billion. Id.
In preparation for these hearings, Subcommittee members reviewed the tax returns of
250 of the largest exempt organizations. See Hearings I, supra note 5. Additionally, in a
closed-session hearing, the Subcommittee questioned I.R.S. field agents regarding specific
cases in which tax-exempt organizations had engaged in abusive dealings or activities. See
Hearings 11, supra note 18. Although the I.R.S. was prohibited from publicly disclosing the
names and identities of the taxpayers discussed during the closed session, the types of
abuses involved were nevertheless described in general terms. Id.; I.R.C. § 6103 (1988)
(prohibiting disclosure of taxpayer identities unless within specific statutory exception).
20 An ancillary concern raised during the meetings was the potential abuse of tax-exempt
bond financing. See Hearings II, supra note 18; see also Gaul & Borowski, Cheap Money,
supra note 17, at 1.
21 I.R.C. § 501(c3) (1988); see infra notes 54-62 and accompanying text (discussing pri-
vate benefit).
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directors, or shareholders.22 Thus, Subcommittee members were trou-
bled by the occurrence of self-dealing transactions that often appeared to
confer a prohibited benefit on organization insiders.28 In particular, the
payment of executive compensation and benefits was perhaps the most
often-cited area of abuse by public charities.2 4 In addition to arguably
excessive salaries,25 the Subcommittee was disturbed by the many indi-
rect forms of compensation provided to executives including interest-free
loans 26 and the payment of executives' living and recreational
expenses.2 7
22 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); see infra notes 63-76 and accompanying text (discussing private
inurement).
23 See Hearings I, supra note 5, at 29-30; Hearings II, supra note 18 (testimony of Hon.
Dan Morales, Attorney General of Texas, describing acts of self-dealing by exempt organi-
zations). Based on testimony of I.R.S. field agents, Subcommittee members learned of vari-
ous examples of abusive self-dealing transactions including: (1) the leasing of buildings,
land, and other properties to an insider without charging rent; (2) the sale of a hospital to a
profit corporation controlled by the hospital's board at a price below its fair market value.
See Hearings II, supra note 18; see also supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text (describ-
ing news accounts of self-dealing transactions by exempt organizations).
24 See Hearings I, supra note 5, at 12 (testimony of I.R.S. Commissioner); see also Gaul &
Borowski, Charity Really Pays, supra note 17, at Al (discussing high compensation of exec-
utives at tax-exempt organizations).
25 See Hearings I, supra note 5. Initially, the Subcommittee observed, with apparent dis-
may, that 15% of the executives from the largest 250 exempt organizations earned more
than $200,000 annually, and that 38 individuals of the same organizations were earning
more than $400,000. Id. In the hearings conducted on August 2, 1993, the Director of the
I.R.S.'s Exempt Organizations Division presented examples, based on actual audits, of
high, and arguably excessive, compensation packages of officers of exempt organizations.
See Hearings II, supra note 18. One instance involved the chief executive officer of a health
care organization who earned over $1 million in base salary, executive compensation, and
other benefits. But see Hearings I, supra note 5 (testimony of Bennett Weiner, Vice-Presi-
dent of Philanthropic Advisory Service, stating that executive compensation in tax-exempt
sector is generally not excessive but in line with demands of market).
26 See Hearings I, supra note 5. The Subcommittee learned of one case in which the presi-
dent of a school received a $1 million loan to purchase and renovate his home; the loan had
a term of 50 years and was interest free. Id.
27 See Hearings II, supra note 18. In one case, for example, an executive of an exempt
organization paid for his "child's college tuition, leased a luxury car for his wife, had his
kitchen remodeled, and rented a vacation house" using organization assets. Id. In the
same case, the charity allowed the executive to charge almost $60,000 on the organization's
credit card. Id. In another case, the CEO of an exempt organization used organization
assets to pay for "such personal items as liquor, china, crystal, perfume, airplane, and thea-
ter tickets." Id.
Although the Subcommittee acknowledged that these types of abuses were clearly ex-
ceptions to general practice, it nevertheless noted that "charities are not immune from
abuse by executives more interested in lining their own pockets than in serving the public."
Id.
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Although section 501(c)(3) exempt organizations do not generally
pay federal income tax,28 in most cases, they are required to file an an-
nual informational tax return on I.R.S. Form 990.29 Form 990, which is
available for public inspection,30 requires disclosure of organization rev-
enues and expenses. 1 Internal Revenue Service officials testified that
the current Form 990 permits public charities to hide the payment of
executives' personal expenses and misrepresent the amount of charitable
activities they perform.3 2 In addition, these officials were concerned
with the lack of diligence used by exempt organizations in filling out
these forms, which are often incorrectly or only partially completed when
filed.33
Perhaps a unifying theme of the hearings was the concern that cur-
rent law does not provide the I.R.S. with appropriate administrative
remedies to respond to abuses by public charities.3 4 Currently, if a pub-
lic charity is found in violation of one or more statutory or regulatory
requirements, the primary course of action available to the I.R.S. is revo-
cation of the organization's tax-exempt status.35 Although this response
appears equitable, in many cases revocation fails to punish the culpable
28 See I.R.C. § 501(a), (c) (1988). But see id. § 501(b) (1988) (imposing tax on unrelated
business income).
29 Id. § 6033(a) (1988). The filing requirement does apply, inter alia, with respect to
churches and other religious organizations as well as organizations whose gross receipts do
not normally exceed $5,000. See HoPKINs, supra note 1, § 34.3, at 643-44. The I.R.S., using
its discretion under section 6033(a), has indicated that churches and other organizations
whose gross receipts do not normally exceed $25,000 will not have to file. Rev. Proc. 83-23,
1983-1 C.B. 687.
30 I.R.C. § 6104(e)(2) (1988); see infra notes 142-45 and accompanying text (discussing
public's access to Forms 990).
31 See generally HoPKINs, supra note 1, § 34.3 (discussing reporting requirements). In par-
ticular, certain items must be provided such as public contributions and similar revenues
as well as various expenses including compensation, fundraising, and management ex-
penses. Id.
32 See Hearings II, supra note 18.
33 See Hearings I, supra note 5; Hearings II, supra note 18.
The Subcommittee was also interested in determining whether the I.R.S. had sufficient
resources and personnel to effectively monitor exempt organization compliance. See Hear-
ings I, supra note 5. It was noted that the I.R.S. has fewer employees today monitoring
exempt organization than in 1980. Id. In response, the I.R.S. contended that, although
more resources would be helpful, their current focus on the larger organizations does not
necessarily require additional staff or other resources. Id. See generally Gaul & Borowski,
IRS Can't Keep Up, supra note 17, at Al.
34 See Hearings I, supra note 5.
35 See Hearings I, supra note 5. The I.R.S. can also respond to exempt organization viola-
tions by entering into a "closing agreement" with the organization. Id. A closing agree-
ment is essentially a contract between the I.R.S. and the organization whereby the organi-
zation promises to take certain corrective action, or pay taxes, or both, in order to maintain
its tax-exempt status. Id. Although this type of action is generally less harmful than revo-
cation, it is administratively cumbersome since each closing agreement must be individu-
TAX-EXEMPT PUBLIC CHARITIES
parties and, in effect, may penalize the intended beneficiaries of the
charity or organization.
36
It is submitted that, due to the abusive activities occurring at public
charities, statutory reform is necessary to prevent future incidents and
restore the public's confidence in these institutions. Recently, members
of the federal government as well as private institutions have suggested
certain legislative revisions. In particular, so-called "intermediate sanc-
tions" legislation has been proposed, which essentially imposes an excise
tax on certain proscribed activities. In addition, suggestions have been
made for increasing the amount and quality of disclosure by public
charities.
This Article will review and analyze the significant proposals made
and suggest how accountability to the general public and compliance
with governing laws can be increased. Part I briefly outlines the rele-
vant requirements for exemption under section 501(c)(3). Part II ana-
lyzes the various approaches to intermediate sanctions legislation and
concludes that a narrowly-focused approach should be implemented. Fi-
nally, Part III evaluates the recent proposals for increasing and improv-
ing disclosure. This Part asserts that, while the recent proposals are
helpful, other alternatives explored in this Part may prove more
effective.
I. BACKGROUND: THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 501(c)(3)
Section 501(a) provides an exemption from federal income tax for
organizations that satisfy the requirements described in sections 501(c)
and 501(d).3 7 Although these provisions cover different types of organi-
zations,38 section 501(c)(3) describes the most commonly-known and sig-
ally negotiated. See id. Further, since each closing agreement is unique, maintaining con-
sistency between similarly-situated parties may be difficult. Id.
36 See Hearings I, supra note 5. For example, if the officers of an exempt organization self-
deal, thereby causing the I.R.S. to revoke the organization's tax-exemption, the harm re-
sulting from a subsequent termination of the organization would fall primarily on the indi-
viduals relying on the organization's services, and not on the responsible officers. See Hear-
ings III, supra note 18 (illustrating by example inadequacies of existing sanctions).
Because revocation has such severe consequences, the I.R.S. revoked only approximately
500 exemptions in 1992, as compared to approving over 30,000 new applications. See Hear-
ings I, supra note 5.
37 I.R.C. § 501(a) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-i (as amended in 1982).
38 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(2) (1988) (title holding companies); Id. § 501(cX4) (civic leagues
and social welfare organizations); Id. § 501(c)(5) (labor and agricultural organizations); Id.
§ 501(c)(6) (business leagues); Id. § 501(c)(7) (social clubs); I.R.C. § 501(c)(9) (employee as-
sociations); Id. § 501(cX10) (fraternal associations); Id. § 501(c)(11) (teachers' retirement
fund associations); Id. § 501(c)(12) (1988 & Supp. 1994) (life insurance associations); Id.
§ 501(c)(13) (1988) (cemetery companies); I.R.C. § 501(d) (religious and apostolic organiza-
209
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nificant category which exempts organizations 9 that are "organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific... or educational
purposes."40 To qualify for tax exempt status under section 501(c)(3), an
organization must satisfy four requirements: (1) it must be "organized
and operated exclusively" for exempt purposes; (2) no part of its net earn-
ings may inure to the benefit of a private shareholder or individual; (3)
no part of its activities may constitute intervention or participation in
any political campaign for public office; and (4) no substantial part of its
activities may consist of political or lobbying activities. 41 This Part will
discuss the first two requirements since they are relevant to analyzing
recent abuses by public charities.
A. 'Organized and Operated Exclusively" for Exempt Purposes
According to the Treasury regulations, the requirement that an or-
ganization be "organized and operated exclusively for religious, charita-
ble, scientific ... or educational purposes" represents two separate and
distinct inquiries: an "organizational test" and an "operational test."4 2
The organizational test requires that the articles of organization 4 3 limit
the organization's purposes to one or more of those listed in the stat-
ute.44 Similarly, the operational test requires that the organization's ac-
tivities actually seek to accomplish one or more exempt purposes.4 5
Although section 501(c)(3) requires that an organization be "organized
and operated exclusively" for exempt purposes,4 6 the term "exclusively"
has not been accorded its literal meaning.4 7 Rather, it has been inter-
tions). See generally JACOB MERTENS, JR., LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 34.01-.171
(discussing various categories of exempt organizations).
39 I.R.C. § 501(cX3) (1988). Only a "[clorporation, and any community chest, fund, or foun-
dation" may be exempt under section 501(c)(3). Id.
40 Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.501(cX3)-1 (as amended in 1990). See generally HoPKINS, supra note
1, at 55-80 (discussing development and interpretation of "charitable" purpose); TREUSCH,
supra note 3, at 117-40 (analyzing section 501(cX3) exempt purposes).
41 I.R.C. § 501(cX3) (1988).
42 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b), (c).
43 Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(bX2). The regulations define "articles of organization" as including a
"trust instrument," "corporate charter," "articles of association, or any other written instru-
ment by which the organization is created." Id.
44 Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)l). The organizational test also requires that the articles of organi-
zation do not expressly authorize the organization to participate, other than insubstan-
tially, in activities that are not exempt in purpose. Id. In addition, upon dissolution of the
charitable organization, the organizational test requires that its assets be distributed for a
public or charitable purpose. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(cX3)-1(bX4). See generally HoPKINs, supra
note 1 (discussing organizational test).
45 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(cX1) (as amended in 1990). See generally TREUSCH, supra
note 3, at 101-02 (discussing operational test).
46 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988) (emphasis added).
47 See HoPKINs, supra note 1, at 107; TREUSCH, supra note 3, at 225.
210
TAx-ExEMPT PUBLIC CHARITIES
preted to mean "primarily" or "substantially," and not "solely."48 Thus,
an organization can still qualify for tax exempt status despite having
some nonexempt purposes, such as ancillary business activities.4 9 Case
law and I.R.S. rulings permit such nonexempt activities to the extent
they are not "substantial," but rather are "only incidental" to the organi-
zation's pursuit of valid exempt purposes.50 The determination of
whether an organization's nonexempt activities are "insubstantial" is a
question of fact, requiring analysis of all relevant facts and circum-
stances.5 1 Various factors considered include the profitability of the non-
exempt activities5 2 and the extent of the organization's participation in
such activities.5 3
To determine whether an organization qualifies under section
501(c)(3), courts and the I.R.S. also apply the "private benefit" doctrine.
48 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(cX3)-1(b) (as amended in 1990) (allowing articles of organization
to authorize "insubstantial" portion of exempt organization's activities to be nonexempt);
Id. § 1.501(cX3)-l(c) (stating that organization operates exclusively for exempt purposes so
long as it "engages primarily in [such] activities") (emphasis added); HOPKINS, supra note 1,
at 225.
49 See Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945); Trinidad v. Sagrada
Orden, 263 U.S. 578 (1924), superceded by statute as stated in West Va. St. Med. Ass'n v.
Commissioner, 91 T.C. 651 (1988), aff'd 882 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 493 U.S.
1044 (1990); World Family Corp. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 958 (1983). But see Orange
County Agric. Soc'y, Inc. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1602 (1988), aff'd, 893 F.2d
647 (2d Cir. 1990).
Congress has expressly acknowledged that an exempt organization can conduct a trade
or business unrelated to its exempt purpose by enacting the unrelated business income tax
(the "UBIT'). I.R.C. §§ 501(b), 511-514 (1988). See generally Donald C. Haley, The Taxa-
tion of the Unrelated Business Activities of Exempt Organizations: Where Do We Stand?
Where Do We Seem to be Headed?, 7 AxRON TAX J. 61 (1990) (discussing administrative and
judicial application of UBIT provisions).
50 See Better Business Bureau, 326 U.S. at 283 ("The presence of a single... [nonexempt]
purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the number or
importance of truly... [exempt] purposes."); Trinidad, 263 U.S. at 578 (allowing "inciden-
tal" commercial activity of exempt organization); supra note 49; see also TREUSCH, supra
note 3, at 111-17 (citing cases and I.R.S. authority).
51 See Orange County Agric. Soc'y, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1604; Church of Scientology v. Com-
missioner, 83 T.C. 381, 474 (1984), aff'd, 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987); Kentucky Bar
Found. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 921 (1982); B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.
352 (1978). In general, this analysis should focus on the purposes of the nonexempt activi-
ties, and not merely their nature. See Lawrence Zelanek, Serving Two Masters: Commer-
cial Hues and Tax Exempt Organizations, 8 U. PUGET SoUND L. REv. 1 (1984).
52 Church of Scientology, 83 T.C. at 474; Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co. v.
Commissioner, 79 T.C. 1070 (1982); Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 202
(1978); Golden Rule Church Ass'n v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 719, 731 (1964); Gen. Counsel
Mem. 38,283 (Feb. 15, 1980). But see American Bar Endowment v. United States, 761 F.2d
1573 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding profitability not a controlling factor).
53 See Greater United Navajo Dev. Enters., Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 69 (1980), aff'd
mem. 672 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1981); see also TREUSCH, supra note 3, at 111-13 (listing addi-
tional factors and authority).
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This doctrine, which is derived from the operational test,54 prohibits an
organization from benefitting private interests by more than an insub-
stantial amount.55 For example, in American Campaign Academy v.
Commissioner,56 the Tax Court found that a school organized and oper-
ated to train students for political campaign positions substantially
benefitted the private interests of the Republican party and, thus, did
not qualify under section 501(c)(3).5 7 Conversely, in Aid to Artisans, Inc.
v. Commissioner,5" the Tax Court found that an organization which
bought handicrafts from artisans located in impoverished communities
for sale to museums provided substantial public benefit, despite the inci-
dental private benefits to artisans who were not themselves
disadvantaged.59
The I.R.S., in applying this doctrine, requires that any private bene-
fit be both "quantitatively" and "qualitatively" incidental."0 Private ben-
efit is quantitatively incidental if the "overall public benefit conferred by
the [organization's] activit[ies]" is incidental.6 1 On the other hand, pri-
vate benefit is qualitatively incidental if such benefit is considered a
"necessary concomitant of the activity which benefits the public at
large."62
B. No Private Inurement of Net Earnings
An organization exempt under section 501(c)(3) may not allow any
"part of ... [its] net earnings . . .inure to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual."63 This requirement, which prohibits the dis-
tribution of earnings to shareholders, 64 represents the critical, substan-
tive distinction between profit and not-for-profit organizations.6 5 Gener-
ally, the private inurement doctrine is aimed at preventing the "insiders"
54 See HopiuNs, supra note 1, § 12.6.
55 See, e.g., American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989); Golds-
boro Art League, Inc. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 973 (1984); Church of Ethereal Joy v. Com-
missioner, 83 T.C. 20 (1984); Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1968-2 C.B. 117; Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,498
(Jan. 28, 1986).
56 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).
57 Id. at 1079.
58 71 T.C. 202 (1978).
59 Id.
60 See, e.g., Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987); Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789 (Dec. 18,
1978).
61 Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987).
62 Id.
63 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1990).
64 See Hansmann, supra note 7, at 838 (terming private inurement doctrine "nondistribu-
tion constraint").
65 See HopKiNs, supra note 1, § 12.1, at 240.
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of an exempt organization from obtaining private benefits.6 6 In this con-
text, an "insider" includes the creator of the organization,6 7 a share-
holder, or any other individual or group that can influence or control
the actions of the organization. 69 Private inurement may take many
forms; most notably, "self-dealing" transactions often offend this doc-
trine.70 Excessive compensation paid to officers or employees is one in-
stance of private inurement.7 1 Similarly, transactions between insiders
and the organization on below-market terms will constitute private in-
urement.7 2 Private inurement may also occur in less obvious ways such
as when an organization undertakes a joint venture with an entity con-
trolled or owned by an insider 73 or when an insider enjoys unreasonable
fringe benefits.7 4
From an analytical perspective, the private inurement doctrine
seems to overlap with the private benefit doctrine of the operational test.
Although both prohibit public charities from benefitting private inter-
ests, the two doctrines clearly differ in that the private benefit doctrine
applies not only to insiders but also to "disinterested" parties. 75 Thus,
while excessive compensation could violate both the private inurement
and private benefit doctrines, non-arm's length transactions between ex-
empt organizations and third parties could violate only the private bene-
fit doctrine.7 6
66 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1990); HoPKINS, supra note 1, at 241.
67 See, e.g., International Postgraduate Medical Found. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH)
1140 (1989); Gondia Corp. v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 590 (1982).
68 See, e.g., Orange County Agric. Soc'y v. United States, 893 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1990); Bir-
mingham Business College v. Commissioner, 276 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1960).
69 See, e.g., Airlie Found., Inc. v. Commissioner, 826 F. Supp 537 (D.D.C. 1993) (executive
director); Human Eng'g Inst. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 619 (1978) (officers); Texas
Trade Sch. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 642 (1958) (school administration), aff'd per curiam,
272 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1959).
70 See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
71 See HopINs, supra note 1, at 250 n.70 (citing cases in which inurement found based on
excessive compensation). But see Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,674 (June 17, 1987) (allowing or-
ganization to provide profit-sharing plan).
72 See, e.g., Unitary Mission Church v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 507 (1980) (funds borrowed
at below-market interest rate), aff'd per curiam, 647 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1981); Texas Trade
Sch., 30 T.C. at 642 (excessive rental payments).
73 See HoPKINs, supra note 1, at 260.
74 See John Marshall Law Sch. v. United States, 81-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9514 (Ct. Cl. 1981);
Golden Rule Church Ass'n v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 719, 722 (1964), nonacq., 1964-2 C.B.
8.
75 American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053, 1068-69 (1989).
76 Compare supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text (discussing private benefit doctrine)
with supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text (discussing private inurement doctrine).
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II. INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS: How SHOULD THEY BE IMPLEMENTED?
Currently, if the officers, directors, or shareholders of an organiza-
tion exempt under section 501(c)(3) engage in acts resulting in substan-
tial private benefit or private inurement, the I.R.S. may revoke the or-
ganization's tax exemption.77 As noted above, however, this remedy can
have harsh consequences that may neither punish the wrongdoers, nor
ensure that the charity's beneficiaries will be protected.7" Accordingly,
several legislative proposals have been suggested that provide an "inter-
mediate sanction" in the form of an excise tax on certain prohibited acts
of private benefit and private inurement.79 Although the amount and
application of the excise tax vary among the proposals, they are all based
on the two-tier excise tax mechanism applicable to private foundations, a
subset of section 501(c)(3) organizations.
It is asserted that a broad application of the private foundation rules
to public charities is inappropriate given the magnitude and type of
abuses occurring in the tax-exempt sector. Further, even proposals
adopting only the self-dealing restrictions applicable to private founda-
tions are not necessarily appropriate. Finally, it is suggested that a
tightly-focused approach to imposing intermediate sanctions is justified.
Before analyzing the proposals, an overview of the relevant restrictions
governing private foundations is necessary.
A The Private Foundation Regime
Broadly stated, private foundations are distinguishable from other
section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt charitable organizations in that private
foundations derive their principal financial support from one source,
such as an individual or family, rather than from public contributions.8 0
Traditionally, private foundations were the subject of pointed debate, 8
with critics asserting that private foundations served primarily private
interests, rather than public good.82 In response, Congress aimed to cur-
77 See Rev. Proc. 90-27, 1990-1 C.B. 514.
78 See supra note 36.
79 See, e.g, infra notes 114-20, 125-29 and accompanying text (discussing various
proposals).
80 See HoPKINs, supra note 1, at 437. "The 'private' aspect of a private foundation, then,
principally looks to the nature of its financial support, rather than to the nature of its
governance." Id.
81 See JOSEPH C. GOULDEN, THE MONEY GIvERs (1971); WALDEMAR A. NIELSEN, THE BIG
FOUNDATIONS 3-20 (1972); RENE A. WORMSER, FOUNDATIONS: THEIR POWER AND INFLUENCE
(1958).
82 See HopIaNs, supra note 1, § 20.1, at 429-32; NIELSEN, supra note 81, at 5-16; TREUSCH,
supra note 3, at 429-30.
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tail abuses within such organizations through the Tax Reform Act of
1969.83
As a preliminary matter, Congress established two categories of
charitable organizations: "private foundations," which would be subject
to the new restrictions, and "public charities," which would not.84 As
codified under section 509(a) of the Code, a "private foundation" is im-
plicitly defined as an organization described under section 501(c)(3) that,
inter alia, does not: (1) derive a substantial portion of its support from
the government or public contributions;85 or (2) receive more than one-
third of its support from contributions, sales, or services revenues, and
does not receive more than one-third of its gross support from gross in-
vestment income.
8 6
As a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, private foundations are
now subject to an elaborate regulatory regime which imposes an excise
tax on certain prohibited activities.8 7 Of particular relevance is the ex-
cise tax imposed on self-dealing transactions.8 8
"Self-dealing," as defined in the Code, includes sales, leases, loans,
or other transfers of benefit between a private foundation and a "disqual-
ified person."8 9 "Disqualified persons" generally include substantial con-
tributors or owners of the foundation,90 foundation managers, 91 entities
in which disqualified persons have more than a thirty-five percent inter-
est9 2 and family members of certain disqualified persons.93 The Code
provides, however, certain exceptions to the definition of self-dealing
83 Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487; see STAFF OF JoINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXA-
TION, 91ST CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFoRM ACT OF 1969
(Comm. Print. 1970).
84 I.R.C. § 509(a) (1988).
85 Id. § 509(a)(1). This provision specifically excludes "organization[s] described in section
170(b)(1XA)." Id. Organizations described under section 170(b)(1)(a), I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(a)
(1988), include most traditional public charities such as museums, hospitals, churches,
schools, and research institutions. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170(a)-9(eXl)(ii); TREuscH, supra
note 3, at 435.
86 I.R.C. § 509(a)(2) (1988). Two other categories are also not considered private founda-
tions: so-called "support organizations," id. § 509(a)(3), and organizations "organized and
operated for testing for public safety," id. § 509(aX4). See generally TREUSCH, supra note 3,
at 436.
87 See TREuscH, supra note 3, at 548-55.
88 I.R.C. § 4941 (1988).
89 Id. § 4941(d); Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-2 (as amended in 1984); see, e.g., Rev. Rul. 78-
395, 1978-2 C.B. 270 (transfer of property); Rev. Rul. 76-18, 1976-1 C.B. 355 (sale of goods).
90 I.R.C. § 4946(a)(1)(A),(C) (1988).
91 Id. § 4946(a)(1)(B); see id. § 4946(b)(1) (defining "foundation manager" to include "of-
ficer, director, or trustee of [the] foundation").
92 Id. § 4946(a)(1)(E)-(G).
93 Id. § 4946(a)(1)(D).
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which, for example, permit the payment of reasonable compensation to
certain disqualified persons.9
4
The excise tax on self-dealing adopts a two-tiered approach. Ini-
tially, a disqualified person who engages in an act of self-dealing will be
liable for 5% of the "amount involved"9 5-the greater of the amount of
money and property given or the amount of money and property re-
ceived. 96 As part of this first level of tax, a foundation manager who
knowingly participates in such act will similarly be subject to a tax of
2.5% of the amount involved.9 7 If the act of self-dealing resulting in the
initial excise is not "corrected" within the taxable period,98 the second
tier of the tax will be triggered, and the disqualified person and founda-
tion manager will be liable for an additional tax equal to 200% and 50%,
respectively, of the amount involved.99 To avoid this second level of tax,
curative steps must be taken to either "undo" the transaction, if possible,
or provide restitution to the foundation. 0°
In addition to self-dealing transactions, a similar two-level excise
tax is imposed on certain other activities engaged in by private founda-
tions. These activities include: maintaining excessive business hold-
ings,' 0 1 incurring certain taxable expenditures, 0 2 making unreasonable
or so-called "jeopardizing" investments'0 3 and accumulating assets.' 0 4
In yet other instances, a private foundation may be subject to a single
excise tax. For example, if a private foundation terminates without first
94 Id. § 4941(d)(2)(E); Kermit Fischer Found. v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 898, 901
(1990).
95 I.R.C. § 4941 (a)(1) (1988).
96 Id. § 4941(e)(2).
97 Id. § 4941(a)(2).
98 Id. § 4941(e)(1) (defining "taxable period").
99 Id. § 4941(b)(1)-(2). The foundation manager's liability with respect to each level of tax
shall not exceed $10,000. I.R.C. § 4941(c)(2).
100 Id. § 4941(e)(3) (1988).
101 Id. § 4943. Private foundations in combination with certain related parties may not
hold more than a 20% interest in any business enterprise. Id. § 4943(c)(2)(A). This percent-
age is increased to 35% if it can be shown that the private foundation does not have effec-
tive control of the business. Id. § 4943(c)(2)(B).
102 I.R.C. § 4945. Private foundations may not pay or incur expenses related to certain
nonexempt activities such as influencing legislation or a specific election. Id. § 4945(d)(1)-
(2).
103 Id. § 4944. Private foundations are prohibited from making investments that would
"jeopardize" their ability to carry out their tax-exempt purposes. Id. § 4944(a)(1). The
Treasury regulations interpret this requirement to mean that a private foundation man-
ager must exercise ordinary business care and prudence in managing and investing foun-
dation assets, considering all facts and circumstances. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a)(2)(i) (as
amended in 1973).
104 I.R.C. § 4942 (1988). In order to avoid imposition of an excise tax, private foundations
must distribute annually at least five percent of the value of their nonexempt net assets.
Id.
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transferring its assets to another public charity, it will be subject to an
excise tax.105
B. Applying Private Foundation Restrictions to All Section 501(c)(3)
Organizations
One approach to implementing an intermediate sanction regime
with respect to public charities is to adopt all or most of the restrictions
and rules applicable to private foundations.106 This method might ap-
pear attractive since the regulations imposed on private foundations
have successfully curbed abusive activities. Thus, similar results could
be achieved if the same restrictions were imposed on public charities.
While this approach has superficial appeal, the price exacted would be
neither justifiable nor beneficial to the long-term interests of the govern-
ment and general public.
In 1969, after extensive hearings,1 °7 Congress decided that the two-
tiered excise taxes were necessary only with respect to certain section
501(c)(3) organizations-private foundations.' Congress' decision to
allow public charities substantially greater regulatory freedom was pri-
marily based on the belief that public charities, unlike private founda-
tions, were not generally vehicles of abuse.'0 9 Since public charities re-
lied mainly on the general public for their continued financial support,
they were accountable to the public for their actions; in this respect, pub-
lic charities differed markedly from private foundations which were usu-
ally financially independent. Today, public charities still generally rely
on public donations. Thus, because they remain accountable to the pub-
lic, the application of the private foundation rules still appears
inappropriate. 110
Perhaps a more fundamental reason for not adopting all or most of
the private foundation rules is that they would be unnecessary in light of
the actual and alleged abuses of public charities. As noted above, an ex-
cise tax is imposed on private foundations for activities such as excess
105 Id. § 507. Private foundations are also subject to an excise tax on certain investment
income earned. Id. § 4940.
106 See Independent Sector Supports "Most" Proposals on Public Charities' Accountability,
TAx NOTES TODAY, Dec. 16, 1993, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File (sug-
gesting one alternative to public charity reform is adoption of some or all of private founda-
tion restrictions) [hereinafter Independent Sector].
107 Hearings on the Tax Reform Act of 1969 Before the Comm. on House Ways and Means,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in TAx REFORM, 1969: HEARINGS BEFORE THE COM-
MTrTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS, FIRST
SESSION, ON THE SUBJECT OF TAx REFORM (1969).
108 See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
109 See Independent Sector, supra note 106.
110 See Independent Sector, supra note 106. But cf infra notes 135-83 and accompanying
text (discussing need and alternatives to improve public charity disclosure).
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business holdings, taxable expenditures and unreasonable or jeopardiz-
ing investments.'' There is little evidence of such activities within pub-
lic charities to substantiate prohibitions of this nature."i 2 Moreover,
these prohibitions would impose major operational and managerial con-
straints on public charities that would significantly, and inappropriately,
hinder the pursuit of organizations' exempt purposes."
i3
Recently, Representative Fortney Pete Stark introduced a bill that
proposed a limited application of the private foundation rules." 4 In par-
ticular, the bill proposed self-dealing restrictions for public charities that
were very similar to the provisions applicable to private foundations."'
As with private foundations, the bill imposed an absolute prohibition on
"self-dealing" between "disqualified persons" and the exempt organiza-
tion." 6 Under the bill, if a disqualified person engaged in an act of self-
dealing, an initial excise tax would be imposed;" 7 if the act was not sub-
sequently "corrected," the second level of tax would be imposed.i" While
this approach is certainly superior to the wholesale application of the
private foundation rules, the absolute prohibition on self-dealing is inap-
Ill See supra notes 101-104.
112 See supra notes 21-36 and accompanying text (summarizing findings from congres-
sional hearings on public charities).
113 See Robert A. Boisture & Milton Cerny, Second Oversight Subcommittee Hearing Ex-
plores Need for Intermediate Sanctions and More Disclosure, 60 TAX NOTEs 1387, 1390
(1993) (criticizing generally use of private foundation rules in context of public charities).
114 Exempt Organizations Reform Act of 1993, H.R. 3697, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
[hereinafter Stark Bill].
115 Id. In addition the bill proposed that a similar two-level excise tax be imposed with
respect to acts of "private inurement." Id.; see supra notes 63-76 and accompanying text
(discussing private inurement). Further, the bill's provisions would apply not only to sec-
tion 501(c)(3) organizations but also to section 501(c)(4) organizations, which generally in-
clude social and civic welfare organizations. See Stark Bill, supra note 114; I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(4) (1988). See generally Michael W. Peregrine & Bernadette M. Broccolo, Stark
Introduces Exempt Organizations "Intermediate Sanctions" Legislation, 9 EXEMPT ORGA N-
ZATON TAX. REv. 131 (1994) (summarizing and analyzing Stark bill).
116 See Stark Bill, supra note 114. "Self-Dealing" is defined as the "direct or indirect trans-
fer, lease, or license of property between an applicable tax-exempt organization and a dis-
qualified person," and "lending of money or other extension of credit between an applicable
tax-exempt organization and a disqualified person." Id. The term "disqualified person"
includes "any person who was an organization manager at any time during the five year
period ending on the date of [the self-dealing] transaction," "any member of a family" of an
organization manager, or a corporation, partnership, trust, or estate in which organization
managers or their families have more than a 35% interest. Id.
117 Id. Under the Stark bill, for each act of "self-dealing," an initial excise tax would be
imposed on the "disqualified person" and the "organization manager" in the amount of 5%
and 2.5%, respectively.
118 See Stark Bill, supra note 114. Under the bill, "correction" of a prohibited transaction
means preventing any future inurement and either "undoing" the transaction or, if that is
not possible, taking such curative steps as would be prescribed in Treasury regulations. Id.
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propriate with respect to public charities." 9 Very often, public charities
rely heavily on contributions by, or favorable transactions with, organi-
zation insiders who, under the proposed bill, would be disqualified per-
sons. 1 2 0 Particularly in small communities, it is quite common for or-
ganization insiders to provide needed services or goods that otherwise
would be unaffordable or unavailable to the organization.12 1 Thus, an
absolute ban on self-dealing is an exaggerated response with harmful
effects that outweigh the actual abuses it prevents.
C. A Focused Approach to Intermediate Sanctions
The types of abuses occurring within public charities generally in-
volve self-dealing transactions' 22 such as excessive compensation, inter-
est-free loans and other non-arm's length transfers of assets to insid-
ers. 1 2 3 However, as noted above, considering that beneficial self-dealing
transactions frequently take place, an absolute ban would not be an ap-
propriate solution.' 24 Thus, an approach which imposes an intermediate
sanction only to the extent the self-dealing transaction inappropriately
favors an insider, would discourage abusive self-dealing, while permit-
ting self-dealing that confers a benefit on the public charity. Specifically,
an intermediate sanction should be imposed if the transaction between
the insider and the organization does not reflect an arm's length transac-
tion, and the party favored in the deal is the insider.
This approach was recently adopted in a Treasury Department pro-
posal which suggested that an excise tax be imposed on any "excess bene-
fit" conferred on "insiders."'25 An excess benefit "is the excess of the
119 See Administration Proposes Excise Tax to End Abuse by Exempt Entities, DAILY TAX
REP., Mar. 17, 1994, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, BNADTR File [hereinafter Ad-
ministration]; see also Practitioners Criticize Bill on Abusive Transactions, Other Proposals
Brewing, DAILY TAX REP., Dec. 14, 1993, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, BNADTR File
(criticizing Stark bill for not adequately describing "how and when the [self-dealing] provi-
sion might be applied") [hereinafter Practitioners Criticize].
120 See Administration, supra note 119; Independent Sector, supra note 106; Practitioners
Criticize, supra note 119 (noting Stark bill may have "chilling effect on some transactions
that are not abusive").
121 See Independent Sector, supra note 106.
122 See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
123 See supra notes 23-27.
124 See supra notes 119-21.
125 See Hearings III, supra note 18; see also Independent Sector, supra note 106. The In-
dependent Sector, an association of over 850 philanthropic organizations, previously sub-
mitted a proposal that adopted the same approach-albeit with different terminology-as
that of the Treasury. Id. Under the Independent Sector's proposal, a two-tiered excise tax
would be imposed with respect to "non-fair market value use of income or assets" on the
organization, certain beneficiaries, and the organization manager involved. Id. Slightly
more narrow than the Treasury's approach, the Independent Sector's excise tax would ap-
ply only with respect to two types of transactions: (1) the "payment of unreasonable com-
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value of any benefit provided by the organization over the consideration
received by the organization in return for the benefit."' 2 ' Insiders would
include: (1) "the officers, directors, and trustees of the organization;" (2)
"those otherwise in a position to exercise substantial influence over the
organization's affairs;" (3) family members of insiders; and (4) "entities in
which an insider or family members have significant direct or indirect
beneficial interests."127 Under this proposal, an excise tax of 25% would
initially be imposed on the amount of excess benefit provided to an in-
sider. 12 If the excess benefit was not subsequently repaid to the organi-
zation, then an additional tax equal to 200% of the excess benefit would
be imposed.
129
In practice, this regime would generally apply to unreasonable com-
pensation and non-fair market value transfers of organization assets to
insiders.1 30 Thus, while the Treasury's proposal is admittedly limited, it
would nevertheless address the large majority of abuses occurring at
public charities. In addition, for certain flagrant or continuous abuses by
a public charity, the I.R.S. would still retain the authority to revoke the
organization's tax exemption if circumstances otherwise warranted. 13 1
Arguably, a shortcoming of the Treasury's proposal is that it does
not impose an excise tax on all forms of private inurement and private
benefit. This limitation does not appear significant, however, since most
recent abuses involving private inurement and private benefit would be
subject to the proposed excise tax mechanism. 132 In any case, however,
an intermediate sanction based on the private inurement and private
benefit standards might not be effective in light of the very fact-oriented
and imprecise nature of these legal concepts. 13 3 An administrative rem-
edy based on these abstract standards would likely be inefficient and
pensation"; and (2) the "sale, exchange, leasing, or lending of property, or furnishing of
goods, services, or facilities, by or to a public charity" to the extent it does not reflect fair
market value and does not "advance[ ] an exempt purpose." Id.
126 See Hearings III, supra note 18. The tax on excess benefits also applies to section
501(c)(4) organizations, which often include HMOs. Id. This extension of the proposed
excise tax to section 501(c)(4) organizations is attributable to proposed health care reform,
which will likely increase usage of HMOs and, consequently, the possibility of abuse. Id.
127 See Hearings III, supra note 18.
128 Id.
129 Id. For an analysis of the Treasury's intermediate sanctions proposal, see Robert A.
Boisture & Milton Cerny, Treasury Proposes Intermediate Sanctions on Public Charities
and Section 501(c)(4) Organizations, 60 TAx NOTEs 353, 354-56 (1994).
130 See Hearings II1, supra note 18. The determination of unreasonable compensation will
be based on the standards applicable under section 162, which allows deductions for all
ordinary and necessary business expenses. Id.
131 Id.
132 See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
133 See supra notes 54-76 and accompanying text (discussing private benefit and private
inurement).
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could promote inconsistent treatment of similarly-situated
organizations.'
3 4
III. INCREASED DISCLOSURE AND COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENTS
An essential element of improving public charities' compliance with
relevant laws and regulations is to increase the amount and quality of
information available to the general public. Public charities tradition-
ally have been accorded considerable operational flexibility and freedom
from governmental regulation.' 35 However, these benefits are justifiable
only to the extent that public charities are held accountable to their pri-
mary financial contributors-the general public. 13 6 The primary means
of ensuring this accountability has been through permitting the general
public to inspect public charities' annual informational return on I.R.S.
Form 990. At recent congressional hearings, however, it was noted that
Form 990 is not serving its intended purpose since public charities often
misrepresent information or even fail to provide it at all."' As a result,
debate has arisen regarding the manner in which Form 990 should be
revised to resolve these issues.
The Treasury recently proposed several changes to the content and
administration of Form 990. It is asserted, however, that these propos-
als, while helpful, may not provide the needed stimulus to encourage
public accountability by public charities. Specifically, special attention
should be paid to increasing the quality of existing disclosure,' s rather
than creating new categories of disclosure. Accordingly, with this focus,
several additional alternatives are outlined that seek this objective.
A Current Law and Recent Proposals
Under current law, the only penalty imposed for failure to file a
timely or complete Form 990 is $10 for each day the failure continues, up
to the lesser of $5,000 or five percent of the gross receipts of the organiza-
tion for the year."' If the failure is willful, an additional penalty of
134 See Independent Sector, supra note 106. It should be noted that once a limited interme-
diate sanction mechanism is in place, subsequent amendments could be implemented that
would target specific elements of private inurement or private benefit. In this manner, the
restrictions placed on public charities would be implemented only for specific and problem-
atic abusive activities.
135 See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
136 Id.
137 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text; Hearings III, supra note 18.
138 See Hearings II, supra note 18 (noting that major problem with Forms 990 is that por-
tions are frequently left blank) (testimony of Ormstedt, Assistant Attorney General, State
of Connecticut).
139 I.R.C. § 6652(cX1) (1988). But see id. § 6652(c)(3) (providing exception from penalty for
.reasonable cause").
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$1,000 applies. The Treasury recently proposed to increase these penal-
ties from $10 to $100 a day, with a cap of $50,000, for organizations with
gross receipts exceeding $1 million per year.' 4 ° A smaller increase from
$10 to $20 would apply to companies with gross receipts below $1 mil-
lion, with a cap of the lesser of $10,000 or five percent of the gross
receipts. 141
As noted above, any person may review a public charity's Form
990.142 In addition, an organization's application for exemption, sup-
porting documentation, and letters sent by the I.R.S. in response to the
application are available for public inspection. 143 Under existing law,
however, a person interested in examining this information must go to
the organization's place of business to view the documents.14 4 Further,
in these cases, the organization is not required to provide the interested
person with copies of the requested information.145 To improve access to
this data, the Treasury has proposed that an organization be required to
copy and mail the Form 990 or other information upon any person's re-
quest, provided that the person making the request pays a reasonable fee
for copying and mailing the information. 146 A penalty equal to the
amount proposed for the failure to file Form 990 would apply to organiza-
tions that do not comply with requests for copies of their Form 990.147
In its current form, Form 990 includes an itemization of organiza-
tion revenues and expenses, a current balance sheet, and various other
items including a statement of program accomplishments, a list of of-
ficers, directors, and trustees and information regarding taxable subsidi-
aries.'14  The Treasury has proposed that additional information be dis-
140 See Hearings III, supra note 18.
141 Id.
142 Public charities are not required, however, to disclose the names of contributors. I.R.C.
§ 6104(e)(1)(C) (1988).
143 Id. § 6104(e2).
144 Id. Section 6104(e)(2) provides, in relevant part, that an organization exempt under
section 501 must make available for public inspection:
a copy of ... [its exemption] application (together with a copy of any papers
submitted in support of such application and any letter or other document is-
sued by the Internal Revenue Service with respect to such application) ...
during regular business hours by any individual at the principal office of the
organization and, if the organization regularly maintains 1 or more regional or
district offices having 3 or more employees, at each such regional or district
office.
Id.
145 See id.
146 Hearings III, supra note 18.
147 Hearings III, supra note 18.
148 See generally Hopsnqs, supra note 1, § 34.3 (detailing items to be included in Form
990).
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closed on Form 990,149 such as any excise taxes imposed based on excess
benefits or similar sanctions. 150 In addition, the Treasury expressed
support for modifying Form 990 to prevent misrepresentations and in-
crease the accuracy of disclosure by public charities. 5 '
B. Other Proposals to Increase Public Accountability
1. Penalty on Certifying Directors or Trustees
Although, if implemented, the Treasury's proposal to increase the
filing penalties should have some impact on increasing disclosure by
public charities, the overall focus of this approach appears misguided.
When organization insiders have the unbridled power to engage in abu-
sive self-dealing transactions, it is probable that they would be equally
capable of coercing non-disclosure or inaccurate disclosure of these trans-
actions on the Form 990.152 Since under current law, as well as under
the Treasury's proposal, nondisclosure penalties are primarily imposed
on the organization itself,'53 insiders would probably prefer incurring
such penalties to disclosing information indicating abusive transac-
tions.'1 4 This preference against disclosure will be even greater if inter-
mediate sanctions are imposed with respect to abusive self-dealing
transactions. Of course, persistent nondisclosure resulting in the ac-
cumulation of penalties will eventually become known to contributors, at
which point they may either demand accountability or refuse to make
further donations. Unfortunately, it may take years before such account-
ability is ultimately demanded, providing nefarious insiders the opportu-
nity to become unjustly enriched.
In order to increase the amount and quality of disclosure on Form
990, it is submitted that the chairman, on behalf of the charity's board of
directors or trustees, and the controller or responsible officer should be
149 See Hearings III, supra note 18; cf Marlis L. Carson, New Form 990 Contains Revised
Revenue Reporting Requirements, TAX NOrEs TODAY, Mar. 7, 1994, available in LEXIS,
Fedtax Library, TNT File (describing recent changes to Form 990 introduced by I.R.S. in
response to congressional hearings on public charity abuses).
150 Hearings III, supra note 18. In addition, the Treasury proposed that additional infor-
mation be requested on Form 990, such as significant changes in the management of an
organization, changes in the membership of its governing board, and any change of the
certified public accounting firm examining the organization's books and records. Id.
151 Id.
152 Indeed, the officer responsible for overseeing the preparation of the Form 990 could
conceivably be the party engaging in such abusive activities.
153 But see I.R.C. § 6652(cXl)(BXii) (1988) (imposing penalty on organization manager who
fails to respond to written demand by I.R.S. for Form 990).
154 Similar to the unfair consequences resulting from exemption revocation, see supra note
36 and accompanying text, this scenario presents the ironic situation in which the culpable
parties are not held responsible while innocent parties-beneficiaries of the organization-
are harmed.
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required to certify the form. This requirement would presumably in-
crease the board's involvement with and supervision of organization ac-
tivities, consequently improving the quality of disclosure and making it
more difficult for officers to act inappropriately. Further, outside direc-
tors, who may not otherwise be involved in the operations of the charity,
would be prompted to scrutinize the decisions and activities of fellow
board members and officers.
As an enforcement incentive, a penalty similar in amount and opera-
tion to that proposed by the Treasury would be imposed directly on each
board member for an incomplete or inaccurate Form 990. In this way,
board members would be motivated to ensure compliance with all disclo-
sure requirements. In fairness, however, certain de minimis exceptions
should be implemented so that penalties will only be levied on board
members for material or substantial failures to complete the form. 
155
Under this proposal, disclosure on Form 990 would be greatly en-
hanced. Equally important perhaps, it would place the penalty burden
on the parties ultimately responsible for any misconduct occurring
within the organization, sparing needless and unfair waste of organiza-
tions' assets.
2. Penalty on Tax Return Preparer
Tax return preparers are generally liable for negligent or willful con-
duct that results in the understatement of liability reported on a tax re-
turn. 156 A penalty in the amount of $250 and $1,000 is imposed on the
tax return preparer with respect to negligent or willful conduct, respec-
155 In addition, the penalty should not be imposed if "reasonable cause" can be shown for
failure to properly complete or file the Form 990. Cf I.R.C. § 6652(c)(3) (1988) (providing
"reasonable cause" exception for penalty imposed with respect to organization's failure to
file Form 990).
156 I.R.C. § 6694(a)-(b) (1988 & Supp. 1994). Section 6694(a), the so-called negligence pen-
alty, provides in relevant part that if.
(1) any part of any understatement of liability with respect to any return or
claim for refund is due to a position for which there was not a realistic possibil-
ity of being sustained on the merits, [and]
(2) any person who is an income tax return preparer with respect to such re-
turn or claim knew (or reasonably should have known) of such position, ....
such person shall pay a penalty of $250 with respect to such return or claim
unless it is shown that there is reasonable cause for the understatement and
such person acted in good faith.
Id.
With respect to willful or reckless conduct, I.R.C. section 6694(b) provides, in relevant
part, that if the understatement is due:
(1) to a willful attempt in any manner to understate the liability for tax by a
person who is an income tax return preparer with respect to such return or
claim, or
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tively. 5 7 This penalty, however, only applies with respect to the prepa-
ration of a "tax return."158 As defined in the Treasury regulations, a tax
return does not include Form 990;159 thus, a Form 990 preparer, while
not necessarily aiding or abetting any abusive nondisclosure, is certainly
not motivated to promote accurate and complete disclosure.
It is therefore submitted that, to further encourage full disclosure on
I.R.S. Form 990, a modified understatement penalty be imposed with re-
spect to the Form 990 preparer. Because abusive insiders of public char-
ities can likely control the degree of disclosure on Form 990,160 a third-
party return preparer could serve as an independent reviewer. As under
current law, to avoid a negligence penalty with respect to preparation of
Form 990, the preparer must act reasonably in light of all circum-
stances.161 To avoid a penalty based on willful or fraudulent conduct,
the preparer must undertake a due diligence review of the tax return. 1
62
This due diligence requirement would not require the preparer to under-
take an audit of the public charity's Form 990, or investigate the organi-
zation's books, records, and activities. 163  However, the preparer would
ensure that all information is appropriately supplied on the return, and
that the data is reasonable in light of any information provided to or
known by the preparer.
An underlying assumption of this proposal is that a public charity
will engage an independent tax return preparer to complete its Form
990. However, abusive insiders may simply decline the use of an in-
dependent tax return preparer if they believe that the preparer would
(2) to any reckless or intentional disregard of rules or regulations by any such
person, such person shall pay a penalty of $1,000 with respect to such return or
claim.
Id.
The term "income tax return preparer" means any person who prepares for compensa-
tion any return for or claim for refund of income tax. Id. § 7701(a)(36)(A). Thus, organiza-
tion officers or the controller would not be subject to this penalty since they are not com-
pleting the Form 990 for compensation. See generally IRA L. SHA~moFF, LLAILrrY oF TAX
RETuRN PREPAPEPs (1989).
157 I.R.C. § 6694(a)-(b) (1988 & Supp. 1994).
158 See supra note 155.
159 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-15(c)(1)(ii) (1980).
160 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
161 I.R.C. § 6694(a) (1988 & Supp. 1994). Various factors are considered in determining
whether an income tax preparer acted reasonably, including the nature of the error causing
the understatement, the frequency of errors, and the materiality of the error. See Rev.
Proc. 80-40, 1980-2 C.B. 774; SnLAFiRoFF, supra note 156, at 119-20. Under the Treasury
regulations, a "good faith" defense is available to preparers. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(e) (as
amended in 1992).
162 I.R.C. § 6694(b) (1988 & Supp. 1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(e) (as amended in 1992).
163 Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2, -3 (as amended in 1992); see also SHAFIRoFF, supra note 156, at
159-61 (providing examples and discussing willful conduct penalties).
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increase disclosure, and perhaps expose their illicit activities. Despite
the initial appeal of this preventive measure, a charity's sudden decision
to refuse retention of an independent preparer may have significant neg-
ative consequences. For example, contributors reviewing the Form 990
may question this conduct and withhold their contributions, particularly
if they are familiar with the implicit quality control aspects associated
with the use of independent tax return preparers. Moreover, once the
contributing public becomes fully aware of disclosure safeguards identi-
fied with independent tax return preparers, public charities that use
such preparers may be greatly favored over those that do not.
Several modifications would be needed to adapt the existing
preparer understatement penalty to the Form 990 context. Since public
charities do not generally pay tax, a penalty triggered by an "understate-
ment" is meaningless;164 thus, the preparer penalty should be imposed
with respect to any material omission or misrepresentation that should
reasonably have been known to the preparer.
In addition, the amount of the penalty imposed should be modified.
As noted above, flat penalties of $250 and $1,000 are imposed on return
preparers for negligent or willful conduct, respectively.165 However,
since the goal of the tax return preparer penalty in the public charity
context would be to improve disclosure, rather then to punish the return
preparer, a lower penalty is warranted. Thus, penalties in the amount of
$100 and $250 for negligent or willful conduct should apply, respectively.
Nevertheless, in order to discourage any complacency on the part of tax
return preparers, these penalty amounts should rise with each succes-
sive violation by the preparer. From a policy perspective, a graduated
penalty mechanism is inherently more equitable since it seeks to impose
stiffer penalties only on those preparers who flagrantly and repeatedly
refuse to follow the standards of conduct imposed by law. Moreover, in
such situations, higher penalties are additionally justified on the
grounds that continued refusals to adequately prepare a Form 990 may
indicate collusion with, or at least blind acquiescence to, abusive
insiders.
Finally, the application of the return preparer penalty should
prompt an examination regarding whether any of the other disclosure
penalties discussed above apply, 166 and vice versa. For example, the im-
position of the proposed penalty on board directors may indicate that the
return preparer did not meet the standards of practice required by law
164 I.R.C. § 6694(a)-(b) (1988 & Supp. 1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(c)-(d) (as amended in
1992).
165 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
166 See, e.g., supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text (failure to file Form 990); supra
subpart III(B)(1) (proposed penalty on organization board of directors or trustees).
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and thus is subject to penalty. However, it should be noted that the as-
sessment of one type of disclosure penalty should not result in the auto-
matic assessment of other disclosure penalties since the standards of lia-
bility would differ among the various types of penalties. 167
3. Amendment of Section 6103
Although increasing the amount and quality of disclosure on Form
990 will significantly improve public charity accountability, it must be
acknowledged that many contributors will not seek this information or
otherwise investigate their recipient public charities.'16  Apart from
Form 990,169 the I.R.S. is prohibited from disclosing any other informa-
tion concerning a public charity's identity or findings of abusive or ques-
tionable activities. 170 Thus, while a close examination of a Form 990
may indicate questionable activities, thereby prompting certain contrib-
utors to forego making donations, it would likely not reveal detailed or
transactional information sufficient to attract the media's attention.' 71
Accordingly, those contributors who are not diligent in seeking and ex-
amining Forms 990, or do not obtain privately-conducted public charity
evaluations, 172 will likely be oblivious to any abuses occurring at recipi-
ent charities. On occasions when newspaper headlines described abu-
sive activities at public charities, these accounts were often the result of
167 For example, compare supra note 139 and accompanying text (noting "reasonable
cause" exception to penalty imposed on organizations for failure to file Form 990) with
supra subpart III(B)(2) (imposing liability on return preparers only with respect to negli-
gent or willful conduct).
168 See Boisture & Cerny, supra note 113, at 1390. Indeed, it seems unlikely that the
average contributor would discover the recent revocation of a public charity's tax exemp-
tion since notice of revocation is only indirectly disclosed by the I.R.S., which provides such
notice by merely "de-listing" disqualified organizations from periodic enumerations of tax-
exempt entities. See Hearings I, supra note 5, at 40-41; Hearings II, supra note 18.
169 Under the Treasury's proposal, public charities would be required to disclose the impo-
sition of intermediate or similar sanctions. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
Thus, while examination of Form 990 may indicate some type of wrongdoing, as evidenced
by the imposition of intermediate sanctions, the details surrounding such misconduct may
not be apparent on the face of the Form 990.
170 See infra notes 174-77 and accompanying text (discussing I.R.C. §§ 6103, 6104). It
should be noted, however, that the I.R.S. does provide notice as to the revocation of a public
charity's tax exemption, see supra note 168, but the circumstances surrounding and rea-
sons for the revocation are not provided. See Hearings II, supra note 18.
171 See supra note 164 and accompanying text. But see supra note 17 (describing the Phil-
adelphia Inquirer's 18-month study of 6000 tax-exempt organizations' Forms 990).
Although the Philadelphia Inquirer's investigation yielded significant findings of abuse by
public charities, these discoveries only resulted from a unique and extensive research pro-
ject. See id.
172 See, e.g., Hearings II, supra note 18 (testimony of various public charity "watch dog"
groups describing their review and evaluation procedures).
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voluntary disclosure. 17 3 When such disclosure is not made, confidential-
ity laws prohibit the I.R.S. from publicly disclosing the nature and cir-
cumstances surrounding abusive conduct. It is thus submitted that
these laws be amended to permit public disclosure of information con-
cerning abusive conduct obtained through I.R.S. investigations. In par-
ticular, the public charity's identity should be disclosed along with a de-
scription of the misconduct.
Under current law, section 6103 of the Code provides that tax re-
turns and "return information" are confidential and thus may not be
publicly disclosed, 174 except as otherwise permitted in the Code.'1 7  "Re-
turn information" includes a "taxpayer's identity, the nature, source, or
amount of his income.... whether the taxpayer's return was, is being, or
will be examined or subject to other investigation or processing, or any
other data, received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or col-
lected by the Secretary...."176 To enforce these provisions, certain civil
and criminal fines and penalties are imposed on parties who improperly
disclose confidential information. 177
Thus, section 6103 should be amended to permit disclosure by the
I.R.S. of information regarding certain abusive or questionable activities
by public charities that would not likely appear on Form 990 or other-
wise be publicized. The types of abuses that should be disclosed are
those that would likely have a material impact on a reasonable donor's
decision to contribute to a particular organization. Thus, insignificant or
inadvertent abuses would not be grounds for disclosure. However, if an
organization consistently engages in abuses that, individually, do not ap-
pear material, but when viewed collectively indicate a plan to circumvent
the law, then disclosure would be appropriate.
Upon discovery of such abusive conduct, the I.R.S. would be author-
ized to publicly disclose, either upon request or voluntarily, the identity
of the public charity and any other party materially involved in the
173 See Hearings I, supra note 5. In addition, the I.R.S. has required disclosure as a condi-
tion to a closing agreement. Id.
174 I.R.C. § 6103(a) (1988 & Supp. 1994).
175 See id. § 6104(a)(1)(A), (e) (1988 & Supp. 1994) (permitting disclosure of annual re-
turns and exemption application information of section 501(c)(3) organizations); see also id.
§ 6103(c) (designee of taxpayer); Id. § 6103(d) (1988) (designated representative of state
agency, body or commission charged with administration of state tax laws); Id. § 6103(e)
(1988 & Supp. 1994) (persons having material interest in tax return); I.R.C. § 6103(f)
(1988) (congressional committees); Id. § 6103(g) (President and certain other persons); Id.
§ 6103(h) (officers or employees of Treasury and Justice Department); Id. §§ 6103(i)-(o)
(1988 & Supp. 1994) (listing other exceptions).
176 Id. § 6103(b)(2)(A) (1988).
177 I.R.C. § 7213 (criminal penalty requiring imprisonment up to five years or fine up to
$5,000, or both); Id. § 7431 (civil remedy for willful or negligent disclosure).
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wrongdoing.1 7 s In this way, the public would at least be apprised of cer-
tain significant abuses. Further, it is likely that if such information were
made available, private organizations that now monitor public charities
using Forms 990, among other sources, 179 would be able to greatly en-
hance their quality control efforts. Finally, this increased disclosure
would also provide state and local governments with much needed infor-
mation with which to bolster their own efforts at regulating public
charities. 18 0
The proposed amendment to section 6103 does not appear to greatly
conflict with the underlying intent of the statute. Section 6103 was sig-
nificantly broadened in the the Tax Reform Act of 1976 to reduce then
widespread and abusive use of tax returns and return information by
various government agencies and certain individuals.'18  For example,
Justice Department attorneys commonly used tax return information to
impeach or cross-examine witnesses in both tax and non-tax matters.
8 2
The purpose and use of tax return information in the context of abusive
public charities clearly differs from the questionable practices of govern-
ment officials that led to the 1976 amendments to section 6103.183
178 To implement this proposal, certain definitional items and procedural safeguards
would need to be established. For example, disclosable information concerning a public
charity should be limited to those items that would indicate abusive activities. In terms of
defining "abusive activities," the legal restrictions with respect to private inurement, the
organizational and operational tests, and private benefit should serve as primary compo-
nents. In addition, certain procedural safeguards should be implemented to prevent har-
assment of public charities or unjustified invasion of privacy.
179 See Hearings 11, supra note 18 (describing method and materials used by public charity
"watch dog" groups in reviewing public charities).
180 Id. (implying that confidentiality laws should be amended so that I.R.S. could disclose
information regarding public charity).
181 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1202(a), 90 Stat. 1520. Although even
before amendment, section 6103 proscribed public usage of tax return and return informa-
tion, "[t]hrough executive order, specific statutory provisions and regulations,... dissemi-
nation of [such] became widespread. Nearly every federal agency enjoyed some degree of
access to tax returns or return information." Allan Karnes & Roger Lirely, Striking Back
at the IRS: Using Internal Revenue Code Provisions to Redress Unauthorized Disclosures of
Tax Returns or Return Information, 23 SETON HALL L. REv. 924, 925-26 (1993).
182 See S. REp. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 323-24 (1976). Other alleged abuses in-
volved use by White House officials, including the President, of tax return information for
non-tax matters. Id. at 321-23; see Karnes & Lirely, supra note 181, at 925-26 (discussing
history and abuses prompting revision of section 6103).
183 Indeed, this type of increased disclosure is further supported by the policies embodied
in the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988), which generally seeks to promote
free and open access to information held by government agencies. See B. MEZMES ET AL.,
ADMI sTRATIvE LAw § 7.05 (1984). But cf Vivian M. Raby, Note, The Freedom ofInforma-
tion Act and the I.R.S. Confidentiality Statute: A Proper Analysis, 54 U. CiN. L. Rev. 605,
615-17 (1985) (discussing conflicts between section 6103 and Freedom of Information Act).
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Admittedly, the proposed amendment will draw criticism, particu-
larly from the tax-exempt sector. However, any actual or perceived ineq-
uity resulting from increased public access to such return information is
more than compensated by the substantial economic subsidy-embodied
in the grant of federal tax exemption-that is provided to these organiza-
tions. Moreover, the public, serving the dual role of financial contributor
and taxpayer, deserves at least this degree of accountability. Viewed in
this light, the proposed disclosure amendment seems more than
reasonable.
CONCLUSION
Heightened media and governmental scrutiny of tax-exempt public
charities has painted a disconcerting picture of these traditionally benev-
olent institutions. The frequent occurrence of abusive dealings by organ-
ization insiders validates the widely-held belief that legislative reform is
necessary and, indeed, inevitable. To this end, this Article has consid-
ered solutions regarding the two major components of public charity re-
form: implementing intermediate sanctions and increasing the quality
of public charity disclosure.
Although the I.R.S. is generally reluctant to revoke an abusive char-
ity's tax exemption, the alternative recourse-inaction-has proven
equally inappropriate. Thus, the general consensus that some form of
intermediate sanction is necessary cannot be reasonably disputed. This
Article suggests that the partial or total adoption of the stringent regula-
tory rules applicable to private foundations is unnecessary and poten-
tially injurious to the public good. Instead, the Treasury's proposal that
intermediate sanctions be assessed only to the extent "excess benefit" in-
ures to certain disqualified individuals strikes an appropriate balance,
providing the I.R.S. with an effective enforcement tool without unduly
burdening public charities' operational freedom.
The traditional view that public charities do not require rigorous
regulation rests largely on the assumption that the general public, as
contributors and financial supporters, will demand accountability from
these organizations. The efficacy of this self-regulating approach, how-
ever, depends on the quality of the organization's disclosure to the pub-
lic, which is generally achieved by permitting public access to the organi-
zation's Form 990. Recent evidence that Form 990 disclosure is not
serving this intended purpose has prompted several proposals that seek
to improve such disclosure. While these proposals will likely improve
public accountability, further measures, as proposed herein, are needed.
Members of the tax-exempt sector may, or more likely will, oppose
part or all of the aforementioned proposals. It is asserted, however, that
this type of response is misguided. Although the suggested proposals
230
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may impose some additional burdens on certain public charities, the or-
ganizations that have traditionally followed the letter and spirit of the
law will not experience any negative effects. Indeed, measures aimed at
increasing accountability and compliance will benefit the long-term in-
terests of all public charities by restoring the public's confidence in, and
desire to support, charitable organizations. Thus, the small price paid
now, if at all, in the form of increased compliance and disclosure costs
will result in substantial benefits for public charities of the future.

